

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 105224

44

ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-13 ADP-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01

PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12 AID-20 /136 R

66601

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ EGY: SSHANLEY

APPROVED BY: NEA: ALATHERTON

----- 096191

R 010029 Z JUN 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN

USINT CAIRO

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 105224

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTION PARA 6)

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, EG

SUBJECT: FRG FONMIN SCHEEL VISIT TO EGYPT

1. FRG EMBCOUNS WOLFF CALLED ON DEP ASST SECY ATHERTON
MAY 30 TO CONVEY MESSAGE FROM REDIES ON FRG FONMIN TRIP TO
EGYPT. WOLFF SAID SCHEEL HAD SEEN PRESIDENT SADAT, VICE
PRESIDENT FAWZI AND FONMIN ZAYYAT. SCHEEL HAD ATTEMPTED
TO MAKE HIS INTERLOCUTORS UNDERSTAND THAT US ENDEAVORING
PLAY ROLE OF NEUTRAL, OBJECTIVE MEDIATOR. IN THIS CONTEXT,
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 105224

SCHEEL EMPHASIZED THAT EGYPT MUST BE PREPARED BEGIN DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL UNDER UN OR OTHER AUSPICES. SCHEEL FOUND SADAT VERY BITTER WITH FIRM CONVICTION THAT HE HAD OPENED DOOR TO PEACE IN 1971 TO WHICH GESTURE SADAT CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL HAD NEVER REACTED. SADAT ALSO EVIDENCED DEEP MISTRUST OF THE TWO SUPER POWERS. SADAT PROFESSED HIMSELF UNABLE COMPREHEND WHY USG NOT RPT NOT PREPARED DELINEATE OUTLINES OF DURABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST. SADAT ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER USG SUPPORTS ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM. WERE US TRULY NEUTRAL IT WOULD MAKE ITS OPPOSITION MANIFEST, SADAT SAID.

2. SADAT EXPLAINED EGYPTIAN INSISTENCE ON PRIOR ISRAELC COMMITMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BEFORE EGYPT PREPARED ENTER NEGOTIATIONS BY SAYING THAT WITHOUT SUCH COMMITMENT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD IN EFFECT BE EGYPTIAN CAPITULATION. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL NOT ONLY HOLDS STRONG POSITION AS VICTOR BUT ALSO AS OCCUPIER OF EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. BY CONTRAST,

EGYPT HAS NO RPT NO COUNTERVAILING WEIGHT WHICH WOULD ALLOW ENTRY INTO NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE EXPRESSING COMPLETE LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN SUPER POWERS SADAT EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT US INFLUENCE REMAINED DECISIVE FACTOR. UNLESS US CHOOSES TO EXERCISE THIS INFLUENCE EGYPT DOES NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD RIGHT IMBALANCE AS BETWEEN ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AND/ OR SERVE THE INTERESTS OF EITHER OF THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE.

3. WOLFF SAID SCHEEL' S EGYPTIAN INTERLOCUTORS SKEPTICAL VIEW EXTENDED TO SC DEBATE ON ME TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK. EGYPT DESIRED THAT DEBATE WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD WHEREIN LAY RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE OF PEACE EFFORTS TO DATE IN ME. EGYPT DESIRED GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT IN FUTURE PEACE EFFORTS IN MIDDLE EAST BUT IN SERIOUS MEANINGFUL VEIN. EGYPTIANS HAD EXPRESSED NO RPT NO FIRM IDEAS ON ANY PROCEDURAL RESULTS EGYPT DESIRED OBTAIN AS OUTCOME OF DEBATE BUT RATHER SEEMED PREPARED TO SEE HOW SC DEBATE DEVELOPS AND ADJUST TACTICS ACCORDINGLY. SADAT HAD EXPRESSED AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO CONTINUANCE OF JARRING MISSION. GERMANS HAD RECEIVED STRONG IMPRESSION THAT EGYPT DID NOT RPT NOT WISH PROVOKE US VETO. ASHRAF GHORBAL IN ADDRESSING HIMSELF TO JARRING FEB 1971 MEMORANDUM HAD
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 105224

SAID EGYPT DESIRED THAT DOCUMENT BE " KEPT ALIVE IN THE FILES BUT NOT RPT NOT SWEEPED OFF THE TABLE." GHORBAL HAD ALSO SAID EGYPT DID NOT RPT NOT DESIRE SC DEBATE TO BE ESSAY IN POLEMICAL EXCHANGES.

4. WOLFF THEN TURNED TO REDIES' COMMENTS ON THE FOREGOING. HE SAID THAT IN GERMAN ESTIMATION FUTURE US ROLE IN ME

PEACE EFFORTS WAS CONDITIONED UPON NEED FOR US TO BUILD EGYPTIAN CONFIDENCE IN US INTENTIONS. THIS COULD PERHAPS BE ACCOMPLISHED IN BILATERAL ASSURANCES OF SERIOUS US ROLE IN FUTURE OUTSIDE CONTEXT OF SC DEBATE. US MIGHT EXPRESS SUCH INTENT CONDITIONED UPON EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS ENTER INTO SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL. FRG IMPRESSED WITH THOUGHT OF REINVIGORATED JARRING MISSION AS MEANS FOR GETTING MOVEMENT UNDER WAY. POSSIBILITY EXISTED THAT SYG WALDHEIM MIGHT HIMSELF BE ACTIVATED IN THIS REGARD WITH ADVISORY GROUP CONSISTING OF FOUR POWERS AND POSSIBLY ONE OR TWO THIRD WORLD STATES. WOLFF NOTED THAT THERE IS GENERALLY AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE THAT INSTITUTION OF JARRING MISSION BE KEPT ALIVE BUT THAT REACTIVATING JARRING MISSION WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT OF FOUR POWERS WOULD BE FUTILE. HE NOTED THAT PRECONDITION FOR THE PRECEDING WAS WILLINGNESS OF PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS DIALOGUE AND ASKED FOR US VIEWS OF REDIES' COMMENTS.

5. ATHERTON SAID US VIEWS COMMENCED WITH JUDGMENT THAT NOTHING COULD RESULT FROM SC ME DEBATE THAT WOULD ADVANCE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND/ OR PEACE SETTLEMENT. IN OUR VIEW BEST RESULT OF DEBATE WOULD BE FOR NO SETBACK TO THESE GOALS OCCUR; THUS LEAVING THE DOOR OPEN IN THE FUTURE. IN OUR JUDGMENT ANY ATTEMPT TO REWRITE OR INTERPRET SC RES 242 WOULD BE A SETBACK. WE ARE ALSO SKEPTICAL ABOUT ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY NEW MECHANISMS WHETHER TWO POWER, FOUR POWER OR A COMMITTEE. IN ACTUAL FACT THIS WOULD BE REVIVING FOUR POWER TALKS UNDER ANOTHER RUBRIC. THIS WOULD ONLY SERVE DIVERT ATTENTION FROM NEED FOR NEGOTIATING PROCESS. FROM OUR VANTAGE IDEAL OUTCOME OF ME DEBATE WOULD BE CONSENSUS STATEMENT WITHOUT ANY RESOLUTION. RESOLUTION MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO AVOID BUT GOAL WAS NEVERTHELESS WORTHWHILE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 105224

IDEAL CONSENSUS WOULD RECONFIRM SC RES 242 AND EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR CONTINUANCE JARRING MISSION.

6. ATHERTON SAID USG HAD OPEN MIND ABOUT SYG WALDHEIM TAKING ACTIVE ROLE. HE NOTED THAT SC RES 242 GAVE MANDATE TO SYG FOR APPOINTMENT OF JARCONG THUS CLEARLY PLACING RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANDATE ON SYG. HE NOTED THAT ANY OTHER MECHANISM WOULD GO BEYOND PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS OF SC RES 242. HE NOTED THAT CHANGE IN PROCEDURAL ASPECT OF SC RES 242 WOULD BE AS UNWELCOME TO ISRAEL AS ANY SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATION TO THE RESOLUTION. HE AGREED THAT NEGOTIATING PROCESS MUST BE UNDER WAY BEFORE US OR ANY OTHER POWER MIGHT BE HELPFUL. HE NOTED THAT WHILE REPETITION OF THIS TACK MIGHT BE MONOTONOUS, THERE WAS NO RPT NO ALTERNATIVE.

IN THIS REGARD LINE FONMIN SCHEEL HAD TAKEN WITH EGYPTIANS
WAS MOST HELPFUL. RUSH

SECRET

NNNNMAFVVZCZ

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** SECRET

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: GW, PFOR
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 JUN 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973STATE105224
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: NEA/ EGY: SSHANLEY
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: SECSTATE WASHDC
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730622/aaaajdom.tel
Line Count: 176
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ORIGIN NEA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07-Aug-2001 by kellerpr>; APPROVED <12-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> wfs 980210
Subject: FRG FONMIN SCHEEL VISIT TO EGYPT
TAGS: PFOR, EG, GW
To: AMMAN
BEIRUT
BONN
BRUSSELS
CAIRO
LONDON
MOSCOW

PARIS
ROME
TEL AVIV
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005